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One Tire, One Time: The Supreme Court of 
Missouri’s Expansion of Reasonable 
Suspicion 
State v. Smith, 595 S.W.3d 143 (Mo. 2020) (en banc). 
Luke A. Hawley* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 All drivers are familiar with the white “fog line”1 that separates the road 
from the shoulder.  What Missouri drivers may not be familiar with is the fact 
that they can be pulled over any time one of their tires cross that line.  This 
fact may surprise Missouri drivers, in part because it has only recently become 
the law.  While fog line infractions may seem trivial on their face, the traffic 
stops that result from fog line infractions trigger significant constitutional 
repercussions.   
The Constitution of the United States provides that all people have 
certain, fundamental freedoms, and these freedoms include protection from 
unreasonable searches and seizures.2  While the Fourth Amendment has been 
read to require that police officers obtain warrants before searching or seizing 
personal property,3 courts have carved out exceptions to this requirement 
when certain criteria are met.4  One such exception allows for police officers 
to stop drivers when the officer reasonably suspects that the driver has broken 
the law.5  This “reasonable suspicion” standard is often contested by criminal 
defendants who argue that they should not be found guilty of their particular 
 
*B.S. Political Science, University of Central Missouri, 2018; J.D. Candidate, 
University of Missouri School of Law, 2021. I would like to thank Professor Ben 
Trachtenberg for his insight during the writing of this Note, as well as the Missouri 
Law Review for its help in the editing process. 
 1. A “fog line” is a “white line that demarcates the shoulder from the road.” 
Richie v. Dir. of Revenue, 987 S.W.2d 331, 333 (Mo. 1999) (en banc).  
 2. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.  
 3. See Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 557 (2004); State v. Pike, 162 S.W.3d 
464, 472 (Mo. 2005) (en banc). 
 4. See, e.g., Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762 (1969); Terry v. Ohio, 392 
U.S. 1, 22 (1968). 
 5. See, e.g., United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002) 
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offense because the arresting officer was not justified in stopping them in the 
first place.6   
Throughout the country, criminal defendants have often succeeded in 
arguing a lack of reasonable suspicion in “fog line” cases.7  Criminal 
defendants and legal scholars alike reason that because state statutes typically 
do not criminalize brief deviations over the fog line, police officers lack 
reasonable suspicion when they base traffic stops on fog line violations alone.8  
Missouri courts in particular have “consistently ruled in favor of defendants 
who were stopped based on alleged fog line [sic] violations.”9  In fact, 
Missouri courts have regularly held that police officers lacked the reasonable 
suspicion required by the Fourth Amendment even when drivers crossed the 
fog line more than once.10   
In State v. Smith, the Supreme Court of Missouri reviewed the trial 
court’s finding that one single crossing of the “fog line” by one tire provides 
sufficient probable cause for an officer to conduct a traffic stop.11  The 
majority of the court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
finding that the traffic stop was justified.12  A dissent by Judge Stith argued 
that the trial court erred by denying the defendant’s motion to suppress 
evidence obtained through the traffic stop, which the dissent characterized as 
unconstitutional.13  Part II of this Note examines the underlying facts of Smith.  
Part III analyzes the legal background of reasonable suspicion, focusing in 
particular on both the constitutional provisions relating to reasonable 
suspicion and the Missouri precedent that the Supreme Court of Missouri was 
bound by.  Part IV discusses the Supreme Court of Missouri’s decision in 
Smith.  Finally, Part V argues that the majority’s opinion went against the 
great weight of Missouri precedent in holding that fog line infractions are 
sufficient probable cause for traffic stops. 
   II. FACTS AND HOLDINGS 
On January 8, 2017, Sergeant Steven Johnson of the Missouri State 
Highway Patrol stopped Anthony Smith on the side of Interstate 70 in 
 
 6. See Melanie D. Wilson, “You Crossed the Fog Line!” – Kansas, Pretext, and 
the Fourth Amendment, 58 U. KAN. L. REV. 1179, 1180–81 (2010); see also Illinois v. 
Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 125 (2000), United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989). 
 7. Harvey Gee, “U Can’t Touch This” Fog Line: the Improper Use of Fog Line 
Violation as a Pretext for Initiating an Unlawful Fourth Amendment Search and 
Seizure, 36 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 1, 6 (2016). 
 8. Id. at 2–3; see, e.g., United States v. Colin, 314 F.3d 439, 444 (9th Cir. 2002).  
 9. Gee, supra note 7, at 3. 
 10. See, e.g., State v. Roark, 229 S.W.3d 216, 220 (Mo. Ct. App. 2007); State v. 
Abeln, 136 S.W.3d 803, 812 (Mo. Ct. App. 2004); State v. Mendoza, 75 S.W.3d 842, 
845 (Mo. Ct. App. 2002). 
 11. 595 S.W.3d 143 (Mo. 2020) (en banc). 
 12. Id. at 144. 
 13. Id. at 147. 
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Montgomery County, Missouri.14  According to Johnson’s testimony, 
Johnson noticed Smith’s vehicle because Smith activated his turn signal, 
began to change lanes, and then turned his signal off before completing the 
lane change.15  While observing Smith’s vehicle, Johnson saw either both of 
the passenger side tires or one of the passenger side tires cross over the “fog 
line.”16  According to Johnson’s testimony, Smith’s tire crossed over the white 
line on the right side of the roadway such that there was pavement between 
the fog line and the tires.17  Johnson stated that the tire was “no longer within 
the lane of traffic.”18  By all accounts, Smith’s passenger-side tire crossed over 
the fog line one single time.19 
After seeing Smith’s tire cross over the fog line, Johnson pulled Smith 
over to the side of Interstate 70.20  During the traffic stop, Johnson smelled 
marijuana coming from the inside of the vehicle.21  As a result, Johnson asked 
Smith if he had been smoking marijuana.22  Smith responded that he had 
smoked marijuana inside the vehicle during the previous week.23  Smith also 
stated that there was marijuana in the vehicle.24  Johnson searched the vehicle 
and found marijuana.25  Specifically, Johnson found four marijuana cigarettes 
in a backpack in the passenger compartment, as well as approximately four 
pounds of marijuana in Smith’s trunk.26 
Smith was charged with felony possession of a controlled substance and 
possession of drug paraphernalia.27  Prior to trial, Smith filed a motion to 
suppress physical evidence obtained from the search of his vehicle, as well as 
his own incriminating statements.28  In support of his motion, Smith argued 
that “‘[m]erely crossing the fog line is insufficient probable cause to initiate a 
traffic stop in Missouri, ‘[l]egally signaling an intention to change lanes 
creates no reasonable suspicion or probable cause’” sufficient for detention.29   
 
 14. Id. at 148–49. 
 15. Id. at 144. The officer did not, however, state this as a reason for pulling 
Smith over. Id. 
 16. Id. There was some dispute on the record between whether Sgt. Johnson saw 
one or both of Smith’s tires cross over the fog line. Id. at 148. 
 17. Id. at 144. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. 
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The circuit court denied Smith’s motion to suppress.30  The case 
proceeded to a bench trial for one count of possession of a controlled 
substance in violation of Section 579.015 of the Missouri Revised Statutes, 
and one count of possession of drug paraphernalia in violation of Section 
579.074.31  The trial judge found Smith guilty on both counts and sentenced 
him to seven years in prison for the first charge.32  The sentence was 
suspended, and Smith was placed on probation for five years.33  The trial court 
also imposed a $100 fine for Smith’s possession of drug paraphernalia.34 
Smith appealed his conviction, claiming that the circuit court erred in 
denying his motion to suppress.35  Smith argued that Sgt. Johnson’s traffic 
stop was unreasonable and constituted a violation of both his Fourth 
Amendment rights under the United States Constitution and his Section 15 
rights under the Missouri Constitution.36  Smith further argued on appeal that 
all evidence against him was illegally obtained, and the fruit of the poisonous 
tree doctrine should have prohibited the drugs and drug paraphernalia from 
being admitted.37  The Missouri Court of Appeals for the Eastern District 
affirmed the trial court’s decision without filing an extended opinion stating 
the principles of law applicable to the case.38  The Supreme Court of Missouri 
granted transfer and affirmed the trial court’s decision, holding that the officer 
had sufficient probable cause to stop Smith based solely on Smith’s fog line 
transgression.39 
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
Over the years, federal and state courts have articulated various 
justifications for when officers can stop a vehicle.  First, this Part discusses 
the Constitutions of both the United States and the State of Missouri in an 
attempt to provide some background into motorists’ constitutional rights, with 
special attention paid to the development of the “reasonable suspicion” 
standard.  Next, this Part introduces Missouri caselaw, highlighting cases from 
both the Supreme Court of Missouri and the Missouri Court of Appeals that 
discuss whether a vehicle crossing over the “fog line” is sufficient to justify a 
traffic stop.   
 
 30. Id. 
 31. State v. Smith, No. ED 106830, 2019 WL 661140 (Mo. Ct. App. Feb. 19, 
2019), reh’g and/or transfer denied (Mar. 26, 2019), transferred to Mo. S.Ct., 595 
S.W.3d 143 (Mo. 2020), reh’g denied (Mar. 17, 2020). 
 32. State v. Smith, 595 S.W.3d 143, 144 (Mo. 2020) (en banc). 
 33. Id. 
 34. State v. Smith, No. ED 106830, 2019 WL 661140 at *1. 
 35. Smith, 595 S.W.3d at 144. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Brief for Appellant at 2, State v. Smith No. SC 97811 (Mo. 2020) (en banc). 
 38. State v. Smith, No. ED 106830, 2019 WL 661140 at *1. 
 39. Smith, 595 S.W.3d at 144. 
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A. Constitutional Background and Reasonable Suspicion 
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution guarantees the 
right of the people to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures.40  The 
Fourth Amendment states that “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and 
seizures, shall not be violated…”41  The Fourth Amendment goes on to state 
that “no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized.”42  Section 15 of the Missouri Constitution 
largely mirrors the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution, also 
providing that people should remain free from unreasonable searches and 
seizures.43  Additionally, the Supreme Court of Missouri has held that the 
same analysis applies to cases under the Missouri Constitution as cases under 
the Fourth Amendment.44 
Historically, the Supreme Court of the United States read the Fourth 
Amendment to mean that searches without warrants should be presumed 
unlawful unless the facts “unquestionably” show the government had 
probable cause.45  Justice Jackson, writing for the United States Supreme 
Court in Johnson v. United States, articulated the policy underlying the Fourth 
Amendment’s warrant requirement: 
The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped by 
zealous officers, is not that it denies law enforcement the support of 
the usual inferences which reasonable men draw from evidence.  Its 
protection consists in requiring that those inferences be drawn from a 
neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer 
engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.  Any 
assumption that evidence sufficient to support a magistrate’s 
disinterested determination to issue such a search warrant will justify 
the officers in making a search without a warrant would reduce the 
Amendment to a nullity and leave the people’s homes secure only in 
the discretion of police officers. . . . When the right of privacy must 
reasonably yield to the right of search is, as a rule, to be decided by a 
judicial officer, not a policeman or a government enforcement agent.46 
The Court has stated that this policy reflects the values of the framers, 
noting that the authors of the Constitution fought for “a right of personal 
 
 40. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id.  
 43. MO. CONST. Art. I, § 15 (2014).  
 44. See State v. Damask, 936 S.W.2d 565, 570 (Mo. 1996) (en banc). 
 45. Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 33 (1925). 
 46. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13–14 (1948). 
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security against the arbitrary intrusions by official power.”47  Again and again, 
the Court has emphasized that “[n]o right is held more sacred, or is more 
carefully guarded, by the common law, than the right of every individual to 
the possession and control of his own person, free from all restraint or 
interferences of others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law.”48 
Over the decades, both the Supreme Court of the United States and the 
Supreme Court of Missouri have continually reaffirmed that searches and 
seizures without warrants are presumptively unlawful.49  The Court has 
stressed the policy that “deliberate, impartial judgment of a judicial officer 
[should] be interposed between the citizen and the police…”50  The Court has 
also stated that “[t]o hold that an officer may act in his own, unchecked 
discretion upon information too vague and from too untested a source to 
permit a judicial officer to accept it as probable cause for an arrest warrant, 
would subvert this fundamental policy.”51   
The Court has held that searches conducted outside this judicial process 
are “per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment – subject only to a few 
specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.”52  The exceptions to 
the general rule are “jealously and carefully drawn,” and in order for a search 
to qualify under one of the exceptions, “there must be a showing by those who 
seek exemption […] that the exigencies of the situation made that course 
imperative.”53  One such exception to the general rule involves investigatory 
detentions, commonly known as Terry stops.54   
In Terry v. Ohio, the Supreme Court of the United States held for the 
first time that individuals could be stopped based on an officer’s “reasonable 
suspicion” rather than probable cause.55  In Terry,56 an experienced detective 
was on a foot patrol when he noticed two men standing on a street corner.57  
After conferring with a third man, the two took turns walking up to a store 
window and peering inside.58  As a result, the officer believed the men were 
 
 47. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 455 (1971). 
 48. Union Pac. R. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891); see also Terry v. 
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1967); Johnson v. Barnes & Noble Booksellers, Inc., 437 F.3d 
1112, 1116 (11th Cir. 2006).  
 49. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 358 (1967); see also State v. Pike, 
162 S.W.3d 464, 472 (Mo. 2005) (en banc).  
 50. Katz, 389 U.S. at 357 (quoting Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 
481–82 (1963)). 
 51. Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 482. 
 52. Katz, 389 U.S. at 357 (emphasis added); see also Audrey Benison et al., 
Warrantless Searches and Seizures, 87 GEO. L.J. 1124, 1137 (1999).   
 53. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 455 (1971). 
 54. See Pike, 162 S.W.3d at 472. 
 55. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968). 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. at 5. 
 58. Id. at 6. 
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preparing to rob the store.59  The officer approached the men, identified 
himself as a patrolman, and patted down the outside of the men’s clothing.60  
The officer found revolvers on two of the men, and the men were subsequently 
charged with carrying concealed weapons.61  Before trial, the defense moved 
to suppress the weapons, but the trial court denied the motion.62  On appeal, 
the Supreme Court of the United States held that even absent probable cause, 
a police officer may detain a person and conduct a limited search for weapons 
if the officer reasonably believes the person being investigated is “armed and 
presently dangerous to the officer or to others.”63  The Court stated that in 
order to assess the reasonableness of an officer’s conduct, courts must perform 
a balancing test between the public interest and the individual’s right to 
personal security.64  Further, the Court said that for officers to justify such 
intrusions, they must have more than a hunch.65  Rather, they “must be able 
to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with the rational 
inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.”66  Since Terry, 
the Court has gone on to extend the reasonable-suspicion requirement to 
automobile stops, among other things.67   
When interpreting Terry’s reasonable-suspicion requirement, the Court 
has held that because the “balance between the public interest and the 
individual’s right to personal security”68 tilts in favor of a standard less than 
probable cause, the Fourth Amendment’s requirements are satisfied if the stop 
is supported by a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity “may be afoot.”69  
Additionally, the Court has emphasized that when making reasonable-
suspicion determinations, courts should look at the “totality of the 
circumstances” of each case to see whether the officer had a “particularized 
and objective basis” for suspecting criminal activity.70   
The idea is that the reasonable-suspicion standard allows officers to draw 
from their previous experiences and training to make inferences from all of 
the information that is available to them.71  Although an officer’s reliance on 
a mere “hunch” is not sufficient to justify a stop, the likelihood that a crime 
 
 59. Id. at 6. 
 60. Id. at 7. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. at  7–8. 
 63. Id. at  24. 
 64. Id. at 26–27. 
 65. Id. at  22. 
 66. Id. at 21. 
 67. See generally United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 276–77 (2002); United 
States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 421 (1981); Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 727–
28 (1969); see also Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 126 (2000); United States v. 
Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 11 (1989).  
 68. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878 (1975). 
 69. Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 7 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 30). 
 70. Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 273 (quoting Cortez, 449 U.S. at 417–18). 
 71. Id. 
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has taken place does not need to rise to the level required of probable cause – 
which would be required for an arrest – nor does it need to rise to the level of 
satisfying the preponderance of the evidence standard that the government 
would be held to when prosecuting a defendant.72  The Court has recognized 
that the concept of reasonable suspicion is somewhat abstract; however, the 
Court has purposely avoided turning the standard into “a neat set of legal 
rules.”73 
Similarly, Missouri courts have interpreted Terry and other United States 
Supreme Court precedent to mean that police officers may conduct brief, 
investigatory stops of vehicles when they have “a ‘reasonable suspicion’ 
based on ‘specific and articulable facts’ that illegal activity has occurred or is 
occurring.”74  The question, then, is what specific and articulable facts are 
sufficient for an officer to adduce that illegal activity has occurred or is 
occurring.  
B. Missouri Caselaw 
Missouri courts have repeatedly held that “a traffic stop is not justified 
where the only articulable fact offered to support the conclusion of reasonable 
suspicion is that the tires of a motor vehicle crossed the fog line.”75   
In State v. Mendoza, the defendant was driving on the interstate when 
she passed a Missouri State Highway Patrol sergeant parked on the shoulder 
of the road.76  The officer observed the defendant driving in the left-hand 
passing lane despite there being no cars in the right-hand lane.77  As the 
defendant drove past where the officer was parked, the defendant’s driver’s-
side tires “ran onto the yellow line of the shoulder.”78  The officer followed 
the defendant for two miles before initiating a traffic stop.79  The sergeant’s 
traffic stop and subsequent canine search of the defendant’s vehicle yielded 
111 pounds of marijuana.80  Mendoza, the defendant, was charged with 
possession of marijuana and drug trafficking.81  Mendoza filed a motion to 
suppress evidence, and the trial judge denied her motion.82  Mendoza was 
convicted on both counts and appealed her conviction, claiming that the stop 
 
 72. Id. at 274; see also Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 7. 
 73. Ornelas v. United States, 517, U.S. 690, 695–96 (1996).  
 74. State v. Pike, 162 S.W.3d 464, 472 (Mo. 2005) (en banc) (quoting Terry v. 
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1967)).  
 75. State v. Beck, 436 S.W.3d 566, 568 (Mo. Ct. App. 2013) (citing State v. 
Roark, 229 S.W.3d 216, 220 (Mo. Ct. App. 2007)). 
 76. 75 S.W.3d 842, 843–44 (Mo. Ct. App. 2002). 
 77. Id. at 844. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
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had been pretextual.83  The Missouri Court of Appeals for the Southern 
District reversed Mendoza’s conviction, holding that despite the officer’s 
observation that her tires had traveled onto the fog line, there was no 
justification for the officer to stop the defendant.84   
In State v. Abeln, a state trooper was driving west on four-lane Highway 
36 when he received a call from dispatch indicating that someone in a tan 
Carhartt coat had seemed suspicious when purchasing starter fluid at the local 
Orscheln Farm & Home store.85  The call from dispatch indicated that the 
suspect had driven off in a burgundy pickup truck and had purchased funnels 
and hoses earlier in the week.86  The trooper testified that moments later, a 
burgundy pickup truck passed in the eastbound lanes of Highway 36.87  The 
trooper claimed that he could see the driver was wearing a tan Carhartt coat.88  
The trooper made a U-turn across the median so that he could follow the 
burgundy truck; however, the highway changed from four lanes to two lanes, 
and there was a vehicle between the trooper and the burgundy truck.89  The 
trooper testified that he saw the driver, Abeln, reach toward the glove box in 
a suspicious manner.90  Then, the trooper “observed on [two] occasions […] 
that the passenger side tires of the truck traveled over what is commonly 
referred to as the fog line.”91  The trooper subsequently made a traffic stop 
and found evidence that Abeln was attempting to produce a controlled 
substance with the intent to distribute.92  Abeln filed a motion to suppress, 
claiming that the stop had been improper and violated his Fourth Amendment 
right to protection against unreasonable seizure.93  The trial court sustained 
Abeln’s motion and the state appealed that order.94  The Missouri Court of 
Appeals for the Western District upheld the trial court’s granting of Abeln’s 
motion.95  The appellate court found that Abeln’s purchase of starter fluid, 
 
 83. Id.  See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 275 F.3d 673, 680 (8th Cir. 2001). 
 84. Mendoza, 75 S.W.3d at 846. 
 85. State v. Abeln, 136 S.W.3d 803, 807 (Mo. Ct. App. 2004).  Starter fluid is 
commonly used in production methamphetamine. Keegan Hamilton, Methology 101: 




 86. Abeln, 136 S.W.3d at 807.Funnels and tubes of this nature are commonly 
used in the production methamphetamine. Hamilton, supra note 85.  
 87. Abeln, 136 S.W.3d at 807. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. Based on information that Abeln was involved in the local 
methamphetamine trade, the officer believed the items Abeln had purchased were 
likely going to be used to produce methamphetamine. Id.  
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. at 814. 
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along with his previous purchases of hoses and funnels, did not give the 
trooper reasonable suspicion that Abeln was involved in criminal activity.96  
The court went on to say that the fact Abeln had reached into his glove box 
while driving and crossed the fog line twice did “not add enough to the 
equation to give rise to a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.”97  
In State v. Roark, a state trooper received a call from dispatch that a 
possibly intoxicated driver had been driving on Highway 50 toward Sedalia.98  
The report included a vehicle description and license plate number that 
matched the defendant’s vehicle.99  The trooper positioned his vehicle so that 
he could see Roark’s vehicle approach.100  After Roark passed the trooper, the 
trooper pulled into the heavy traffic on Highway 50 some distance behind 
Roark’s vehicle.101  At trial, the state trooper testified that the passenger-side 
tires of the Roark’s vehicle crossed the fog line twice.102  The trooper stated 
that the tires crossed onto the paved shoulder of the road, but none of the 
surrounding traffic was forced to take evasive action.103  Roark subsequently 
pulled into a hotel and parked his vehicle.104  Roark entered the hotel, and the 
state trooper followed Roark inside.105  The trooper found Roark at the hotel 
bar and explained that dispatch had received a call about a drunk driver.106  
The trooper asked Roark to come outside because the officer “needed to 
conduct an investigation to determine if he was, indeed, intoxicated.”107  Once 
outside, the trooper conducted field sobriety tests and placed Roark under 
arrest.108  The trial court overruled Roark’s motion to suppress, and he was 
subsequently convicted.109  Roark appealed, arguing the trooper lacked 
probable cause and the necessary reasonable suspicion for an investigatory 
stop.110  The Missouri Court of Appeals for the Western District 
acknowledged that the only articulable fact offered to support the trooper’s 
reasonable suspicion was the transgression of Roark’s tires over the fog 
line.111  The court held that the trooper was not “aware of articulable facts that 
 
 96. Id. at 812. 
 97. Id. 
 98. State v. Roark, 229 S.W.3d 216, 217 (Mo. Ct. App. 2007). 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. at 217–18. 
 108. Id. at 218. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. at 217. 
 111. Id. at 220. 
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would ‘warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief’ that an offense had 
been committed.”112 
In State v. Beck, the defendant was headed west on a state highway as a 
police officer was headed east on the same road.113  The officer noticed that 
the defendant’s pickup truck was driving over the fog line that separated the 
shoulder of the road from the driving lane.114  The officer turned around, 
caught up with the defendant, and stopped the defendant’s car.115  Beck was 
subsequently arrested for driving while intoxicated.116  Prior to trial, the 
defendant filed a motion to suppress arguing that the mere touching or 
crossing of a fog line cannot justify a traffic stop.117  The trial court granted 
the motion to suppress, and the state appealed.118  The Missouri Court of 
Appeals for the Southern District affirmed the trial court’s decision to grant 
the motion to suppress.119  In support of its decision, the Southern District in 
Beck cited to State v. Roark,120 State v. Abeln,121 and State v. Mendoza.122  The 
court stated that because the officer had observed only “mere touching or 
crossing the fog line,” and because previous Missouri precedent has 
continually said that the mere crossing of the fog line is insufficient for 
establishing reasonable suspicion, the trial court did not err.123   
These Missouri appellate court cases illustrate one central rule: the 
momentary transgression of a vehicle over the fog line, even when coupled 
with other suspicious behavior, is insufficient to establish the necessary 
reasonable suspicion to stop a Missouri driver.  However, the Supreme Court 
of Missouri had not ruled on the issue until it heard State v. Smith.   
IV. INSTANT DECISION 
The Supreme Court of Missouri was tasked with determining whether 
the mere deviation of one tire over the fog line could justify a traffic stop.124  
The court reasoned that if the police officer did have reasonable suspicion to 
believe Smith had committed a traffic violation, the traffic stop would be 
justifiable under the Fourth Amendment and the subsequent discovery of 
marijuana would not be subject to exclusion.125  Therefore, the court’s 
 
 112. Id. at 222 (quoting Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 96 (1964)). 
 113. State v. Beck, 436 S.W. 3d 566, 568 (Mo. Ct. App. 2013). 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. at 569. 
 120. 229 S.W.3d 216, 220 (Mo. Ct. App. 2007). 
 121. 136 S.W.3d 803, 812 (Mo. Ct. App. 2013). 
 122. 75 S.W.3d 842, 845 (Mo. Ct. App. 2002). 
 123. Beck, 436 S.W. 3d at 568. 
 124. Id. (quoting Nardone v. United State, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939)). 
 125. Id. at 145–46. 
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analysis hinged on whether crossing the fog line and driving momentarily on 
the shoulder constitutes a violation of Missouri law.126 
A. The Principal Opinion 
To determine whether crossing the fog line violates Missouri law, the 
court turned to Section 304.015 of the Missouri Revised Statutes.127  Smith’s 
argument was that “[m]erely touching or crossing the fog line does not give 
reasonable suspicion that any crime or traffic offense has occurred.”128  The 
State, on the other hand, contended that crossing the fog line and driving on 
the shoulder – however briefly – is a violation of Section 304.015.129  The 
court was tasked with determining whether “crossing the fog line and driving 
on the shoulder contravenes [Section 304.015] and constitutes a traffic 
violation.”130  In doing so, the court acknowledged that its task was one of 
statutory interpretation.131   
The court noted that “the goal of statutory interpretation is to give effect 
to the [state legislature’s] intent as reflected in the plain language of the statute 
at issue.”132  Section 304.015.2 states that “upon all public roads or highways 
of sufficient width a vehicle shall be driven upon the right half of the 
roadway[.]”133  Section 304.001(12) defines “roadway” as “that portion of a 
state highway ordinarily used for vehicular travel, exclusive of the berm or 
shoulder.”134  The “fog line” is the “white line that demarcates the shoulder 
from the road.”135   
However, Section 304 of the Missouri Revised Statutes does not provide 
a definition of the word “drive.”136  When a term is not defined in a statute, 
the court must give the term its “plain and ordinary meaning as derived from 
the dictionary.”137  In analyzing this case, the court looked to Webster’s 
dictionary, which defines the verb “drive” as “to operate the mechanism and 
controls and direct the course of” a motor vehicle.138  Subsequently, the court 
reasoned that operating and directing the course of a vehicle on the shoulder 
 
 126. Id. at 146. 
 127. Id.; see MO. REV. STAT. § 304.015 (2018). 
 128. Smith, 595 S.W.3d at 146. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. (quoting State v. Jones, 479 S.W.3d 100, 106 (Mo. 2016) (en banc)). 
 133. Id. (quoting MO. REV. STAT. § 304.015). 
 134. Id. (quoting MO. REV. STAT. § 304.001.12). 
 135. Id. (quoting Riche v. Dir. Of Revenue, 987 S.W.2d 331, 333 (Mo. 1999) (en 
banc)). 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. (quoting Mo. Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. Union Elec. Co., 552 S.W.3d 532, 
541 (Mo. 2018) (en banc)). 
 138. Id. (quoting WEBSTER’S NEW INT’L DICTIONARY 692 (3d ed. 2002)).  
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by allowing it to cross over the fog line is a violation of Section 304.015.2.139  
Because Section 304.015.9 states that a violation of Section 304.015 is a class 
C misdemeanor, the court held that the momentary crossing of the fog line is 
not just a traffic violation, but a crime for which drivers can be jailed for 
fifteen days, fined $750, or both.140  As a result of this interpretation, the court 
held that the mere crossing of a fog line is a violation of the law sufficient to 
justify a traffic stop.141 
In applying Section 304.015 to the facts of this case, the court held that 
Smith’s crossing of the fog line and thereby “operating and directing the 
course of his vehicle on the shoulder” was a violation of Missouri law.142  
Because Smith had violated the law, the court avoided reasonable suspicion 
analysis and held that there was actual probable cause for the officer to stop 
Smith.143  As a result, the court concluded that the stop in this case did not 
constitute an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment, and the 
circuit court did not err in denying Smith’s motion to suppress.144 
B. The Dissenting Opinion 
Judge Laura Denvir Stith dissented, arguing that the principal opinion 
was incorrect in finding that one tire momentarily crossing the fog line gave 
probable cause to believe Smith had violated Section 304.015.2.145  Judge 
Stith first addressed the statutory interpretation, arguing that Section 304.015 
does not state that one tire crossing the fog line is a traffic violation; rather, it 
provides that cars must be driven “upon the right half of the roadway.”146  
Judge Stith wrote that the majority opinion cited no authority in support of the 
idea that one momentary crossing of the fog line by a vehicle’s tire constitutes 
a failure to “‘drive’ on the right half of the roadway.”147  While the majority 
relied on a dictionary definition of drive – “‘to operate the mechanism and 
controls and direct the course of’ a motor vehicle” – Judge Stith argued that 
this definition merely raises the question as to what constitutes “operation” or 
“direction.”148   
Judge Stith also made a notice argument.149  Judge Stith pointed out that 
the law only requires drivers to drive on the roadway, as close as practicable 
to the right hand of the road, but this definition fails to provide Missouri 
drivers with notice that if any “particular part of the vehicle goes over the fog 
 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. at 147–48 (Stith, J., dissenting). 
 146. Id. at 148. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. at 149. 
 149. Id. at 149–50. 
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line, no matter how insignificantly, then even though the remainder is in the 
right-hand lane, the driver would be guilty of directing the course of his or her 
vehicle off the roadway.”150  Judge Stith also suggested that if the legislature 
had intended the statute to read this way, the legislature simply could have 
made it do so explicitly.151   
In addition to the statutory interpretation analysis, Judge Stith also 
addressed Missouri precedent.152  Judge Stith highlighted that Missouri courts 
have continually held that such a minor deviation of a tire crossing onto the 
shoulder for a moment does not constitute a traffic offense.153  Judge Stith 
summarized the principal opinion as follows: 
No authority is cited that one momentary crossing of the fog line by a 
vehicle’s tires (if such a crossing even occurred here) constitutes 
failing to “drive” on the right half of the roadway.  To the contrary, 
prior cases from this Court assume, and prior cases of the court of 
appeals and other jurisdictions hold, that such minor deviations of a 
tire onto the shoulder do not constitute a traffic offense.  This Court 
should also so hold.154 
Judge Stith noted that Missouri courts have been using a well-established 
rule that “traffic laws ‘are not unyielding and inflexible and are not to be 
applied rigidly, absolutely and peremptorily without regard to circumstances 
or conditions there existing.’”155  Rather, Judge Stith noted that Missouri law 
is well settled that courts should interpret statutes in a way that is not hyper-
technical, but instead based on reason and logic.156  If the court examined this 
case in such a manner, and had not rigidly read the term “drive” to include a 
tire briefly touching a surface, Judge Stith argued the principal opinion would 
have found that a momentary transgression of a tire over a fog line is not a 
specific and articulable reason sufficient for reasonable suspicion.157 
V. COMMENT 
The precedent established by the Supreme Court of Missouri’s decision 
in Smith leaves Missouri drivers vulnerable to unfettered police and 
prosecutorial discretion.  By allowing police officers to conduct traffic stops 
based solely on the observation that one tire of a vehicle momentarily crossed 
 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. at 150. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. at 148. 
 155. Id. at 150 (quoting Leonard v. Gordon’s Transp., Inc., 575 S.W.2d 244, 249 
(Mo. Ct. App. 1978)). 
 156. Id. (citing Fred Weber, Inc. v. Dir. Of Revenue, 452 S.W.3d 628, 630 (Mo. 
2015) (en banc)). 
 157. Id. at 154. 
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the fog line, the court overturns decades of Missouri precedent and degrades 
the constitutional protections of drivers in the process. The principal opinion’s 
holding that the single, momentary crossing of the fog line by one tire of a 
vehicle constitutes a violation of Missouri law sufficient for constitutionally 
required reasonable suspicion is unsound because it (a) misinterprets the 
applicable Missouri statute, (b) fails to account for Missouri court precedent, 
and (c) creates bad law. 
A. Statutory Interpretation 
  Missouri law does not state that the momentary crossing of the fog line 
by one of a vehicle’s tires is a violation of the law.  As a result of this statutory 
absence, the majority opinion pieces together different Missouri statutes and 
external definitions in an attempt to judicially create a new traffic violation.   
Section 304.015 of the Missouri Revised Statutes states plainly that 
“upon all public roads or highways of sufficient width a vehicle shall be driven 
on the right half of the roadway[.]”158  Because this statute lacks significant 
detail, the court turned to external sources to interpret the words “drive” and 
“roadway.”159  Section 304.001(12) defines “roadway” as “that portion of a 
state highway ordinarily used for vehicular travel, exclusive of the berm or 
shoulder.”160  Because this chapter of the Missouri statutes fails to define the 
word “drive,” the court turned to a dictionary, which provided that to drive 
means to “‘operate the mechanism and controls and direct the course of’ a 
motor vehicle.”161  After piecing together these definitions, the court 
concluded that Section 304.015 requires Missouri drivers to never cross the 
fog line with any portion of their vehicle for any period of time.162  The court 
concluded that if any part of any vehicle does cross over this fog line for any 
period of time, then the driver is in violation of Section 304.015, is guilty of 
a class C misdemeanor, can be justifiably stopped by police officers, and can 
be subsequently jailed and fined.163 
Judge Stith’s dissent pointed out the substantial flaws in this logic, 
calling into question the statutory interpretation upon which the majority’s 
conclusion is based:   
The principal opinion focuses on the word “roadway” and correctly 
notes that section 304.001(12) defines “roadway” as “that portion of a 
state highway ordinarily used for vehicular travel, exclusive of the 
berm or shoulder.” Therefore, the statute requires a car to be driven on 
the roadway, not the shoulder. But that merely begs the question at 
 
 158. MO. REV. STAT § 304.015 (2018). 
 159. Smith, 595 S.W.3d at 146. 
 160. § 304.001(12). 
 161. Smith, 595 S.W.3d at 146 (quoting WEBSTER’S NEW INT’L DICTIONARY 692 
(3d ed. 2002)).  
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. 
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issue here – whether Mr. Smith was “driving” on the shoulder merely 
because one or two of his tires allegedly inadvertently crossed over the 
fog line for an instant.164 
Judge Stith argued that the majority’s reliance upon Webster’s definition 
of “drive” fails to adequately answer this question, stating that “[t]his 
definition […] begs the question as to what constitutes operating or directing 
the course of a motor vehicle off the roadway.”165  Judge Stith’s argument 
essentially comes down to the idea that a momentary crossing of the fog line 
by any part of a vehicle for any period of time cannot be considered “operating 
or directing” the motor vehicle off of the road.  
The majority opinion was wrong in stating that the mere momentary drift 
of any part of a vehicle over the fog line constitutes “driving.”  If a tire, for 
one split second, goes over the fog line, that can hardly be considered 
“operating or directing” the motor vehicle off of the road.  Holding differently 
goes against a typical Missourian’s understanding of the word “drive,” as well 
as the intent of the legislature that drafted these applicable statutes.  If the 
legislature had intended for such minor deviations over the fog line to 
constitute a violation of Missouri law, it could have crafted the applicable 
statutes in a manner that makes that requirement clear.  Piecing together 
different statutory provisions with different external definitions is a means of 
circumventing the legislative intent, holding without basis that the mere 
drifting of one tire over a line somehow constitutes the operation of a vehicle 
off a road.  
The majority’s interpretation of Section 304.015 is also inconsistent with 
the common understanding of Missouri traffic laws.166  Normal Missouri 
drivers occasionally cross over fog lines while driving.  No one is a perfect 
driver, so it makes sense that occasional momentary transgressions will 
happen.  That is the very reason that lines and rumble strips are there in the 
first place – to warn drivers when they have momentarily drifted too far.  
Should the momentary drifting of even one tire across a fog line, however 
brief, constitute a violation of Missouri law sufficient to allow police officers 
to pull drivers over, search their vehicles, and put them in jail?  A normal 
Missouri driver would answer “no,” and because the legislative intent would 
seem to agree, the Supreme Court of Missouri was wrong to hold otherwise.  
B. Missouri Precedent 
Decisions by lower Missouri courts have interpreted Section 304.015 in 
a manner more consistent with the clear legislative intent and the general 
understanding of the driving public.  Missouri courts have long held that the 
mere momentary crossing of one tire over a fog line, even in conjunction with 
other suspicious behavior, is an insufficient basis for reasonable suspicion.  
 
 164. Id. at 149. 
 165. Id. 
 166. See id. at 150 (Stith, J., dissenting). 
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This is because merely crossing the fog line is not an explicit violation of 
Missouri law.  This repeated lower court interpretation makes sense because 
the Missouri Revised Statutes do not criminalize such behavior, as discussed 
above.  
While the Supreme Court of Missouri is certainly not bound by the 
Missouri Court of Appeals, it should have taken the lower courts’ opinions – 
based on plain meaning and sound interpretations of the legislative intent – 
into account when deciding Smith.  However, the majority’s holding in Smith 
effectively ignored this Missouri precedent without giving a reason for doing 
so.  This refusal to address previous Missouri cases led the court to baselessly 
hold that the momentary transgression of one tire over a fog line is sufficient 
for reasonable suspicion.  To protect the constitutional rights of Missouri 
drivers, the Supreme Court of Missouri should not have made such a deviation 
from Missouri precedent. 
Based on a review of both the majority and the dissenting opinions, as 
well as analysis of the Missouri precedent cited by Judge Stith, the majority’s 
holding in Smith is against the great weight of Missouri precedent.  Missouri 
cases have continually held the brief crossing of the fog line does not violate 
any Missouri statute.  On the contrary, lower Missouri appellate courts have 
repeatedly held that the crossing of a fog line more than once, even in 
conjunction with other suspicious behavior, does not rise to the level of 
reasonable suspicion required for investigatory stops.  Holding to the contrary 
is completely illogical based on the definitions provided by the majority in 
support of their decision.  The Supreme Court of Missouri’s holding in Smith 
reduces the constitutional rights guaranteed to all Missouri drivers.  As such, 
Judge Stith’s argument should have prevailed in holding that the momentary 
transgression of one tire over the fog line is insufficient as the basis for 
reasonable suspicion required to initiate a traffic stop.  
C. Creation of Bad Law 
In ignoring the legislative intent and applicable precedent, the principal 
opinion in Smith created bad law.  The principal opinion created a new rule 
allowing for Missouri drivers to be stopped, searched, fined, and jailed simply 
because they let one of their tires briefly cross over the fog line.  This rule is 
bad on its merits and will undoubtedly be a shock to any driver against whom 
it is used.  
It is ridiculous to hold that any person who lets one of their tires briefly 
cross the fog line can be jailed for doing so, and while prosecutors may not 
actually fine or jail defendants for crossing the fog line, that is exactly what 
the Supreme Court of Missouri has allowed.  Are we to believe that those who 
let their cars drift a few inches too far should be put in jail to rehabilitate from 
their illegal activity?  Are we to believe that those who cross over the fog line 
are so dangerous that they should be locked up to keep the rest of us safe?  Of 
course not.  Such a rule clearly goes against logic and reason and has no place 
in Missouri law.  Drivers sometimes cross the fog line, and a rule that allows 
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the criminal justice system to use unfettered discretion in stopping, searching, 
fining, and jailing them for doing so is appalling.  
VI.  CONCLUSION 
In State v. Smith, the Supreme Court of Missouri upheld the trial court’s 
decision to deny Smith’s motion to suppress evidence of his stop, holding that 
the momentary crossing Smith’s tire over the fog line constituted a violation 
of Missouri law sufficient for a showing of reasonable suspicion.  The court’s 
decision goes against the great weight of Missouri case precedent.  As a result, 
the court’s decision sets a new standard – one that allows police officers to 
conduct traffic stops, search vehicles, and put people in jail any time they 
allege to have seen a tire cross across a fog line.  This precedent substantially 
damages Missouri drivers’ fundamental freedoms provided by the 
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